Abstract: Agency theory infers that investors will incur cost to make alignment on principal-agent interest. A critic, however, has pointed out that the conflict of interest between principal and agent is not the only cause for agency cost. Cultural context (Johnson & Droege, 2004) and legal system (La Porta, et al., 2000) are also found as contributing factors. This study is to empirically investigate how board size, board independency, audit committee size and audit committee independency affect the earnings quality in the context of low or high level agency cost country according to Transparency International's corruption level and Hofstede's cultural values. 538 firm-year across 6 South East Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) are observed in this research. Five Different accrual models (Jones, 1991; Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, Detecting Earnings Management, 1995; Kasznik, 1999 ; Dechow, Richardson, & Tuna, Earnings management and costs to investors from firms meeting or slightly exceeding benchmarks, 2002; Dechow & Dichev, The Quality of Accruals and Earnings: The Role of Accrual Estimation Errors, 2002) are used to generate abnormal accruals which will be used as proxy for earnings management while to generate suitable factors from corporate governance variables, principal component analysis (PCA) is employed. Results indicate that (1) earnings management is efficient; (2) size and independency of Board of Director and audit committee are effective in reducing earnings management behaviour; (3) the management of firms operating in higher agency cost context will take advantage from the structure of corporate governance (size and independency of Board of Directors and audit committee) to conduct earnings management. Additionally, it is also found that bigger size (higher leverage) firms perform less (more) accounting discretion compared to their counterparts.
INTRODUCTION
According to general theory of agency, it is predictable that investors will incur cost to make managers operate for maximisation of firm's value because interests between agents and principal are different (agency conflict). Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that it is impossible for agents to operate at absolutely no cost in order to maximise principal's wealth. Managers implicitly require stimulus from shareholders to assure that each action taken in a firm is consistent with maximising company's value.
However, critic has pointed out that social life also considers about relationship, legal/political environment and other social constructs. Therefore, the principal-agent conflict is not the only determinant for agency cost. Empirically, it is found that preference toward risk (Stroh, Brett, Baumann, & Reilly, 1996; Ghosh & John, 2000) and cross-culture differences that distinguish understanding of compensation between US and European societies (Pennings, 1993) influence the agency cost. Considering that, studies of correlation between cultural contexts (Johnson & Droege, 2004) or legal system (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000) and agency costs are immensely relevant. To know the correlation will be useful to understand the circumstances embedding agency costs which in turn help various stakeholders, with various interests, to take proper actions across countries.
Furthermore, the correlation of agency cost and cultural context and legal system will be useful to answer concerns of corporate governance in specific nationality (Judge, 2012) . In emerging countries, the ownership tends to be concentrated and the conflicts mostly are between principal and principal i.e. between majority and minority shareholder. This is different from UK and US context. Young, et al. (Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal-Principal Perspective, 2008) pointed out principalprincipal modus operandi that causes conflict such as signing in the unqualified relatives or cronies to urgent positions and conducting abuse of company asset and resource. Therefore, studies of corporate governance in countries with certain level of agency costs are worth of conduct because agency costs embedded from cultural values and legal systems vary across countries. The correlation of earnings quality and corporate governance whether the agency cost is higher or lower will be useful for various stakeholders.
Thus, this study scrutinises the cultural and corruption level differences across South-East Asian (SEA) countries affecting earnings management. This study is intended to contribute to the existing literature by examining how differences in culture and corruption may affect the agent behaviours in smoothing earnings. This is due to the fact that the correlation between earnings management and agency cost are still controversial. In one hand, it is argued that earnings management and agency cost are negatively correlated. In the context of low agency cost, managers may do earnings smoothing to predict future performance and to signal the market about the current performance (Arya, Glover, & Sunder, 2003) . Shareholders, in this condition, support their agent to conduct such action. On the other hand, it is contended that managers in firm with high agency costs are more likely to do misconduct that detrimentally affects stakeholders (Healy & Wahlen, A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and Its Implications for Standard Setting, 1999) . Concealing information and deciding less conservative accounting report are opportunistic behaviours that could risk the value of firm (Healy & Palepu, 1993) . Risks such as low credibility of financial statement (Ragan, 1998) and get sued by external stakeholders for reporting deceitful information are indeed undeniable.
The second phase of this study investigates the correlation of corporate governance and earnings quality and their correlation when agency cost level (lower/higher) is taken into account. Four corporate governance variables identified in this study are size of board directors, independency of board directors, size of audit committee, and independency of audit committee.
Existing literatures mostly focus on East Asia (EA) not SEA countries (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Fan & Wong, 2002) . Instead of EA countries, this study focuses on SEA countries because there are huge differences between EA and SEA countries. Even though SEA is a part of EA, they vary on geographical area, economic cooperation of Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and more importantly in terms of cultural values and corruption index. EA countries that are not included in SEA (such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong) are perceived cleaner in public governance than SEA countries in 2015 (Transparency International, 2015) . Also, cultural values of collectivism and power distance are generally higher in SEA countries rather than the rest of EA countries (Culture Compass, 2010 Results indicate that (1) earnings management is efficient, (2) indeed independency and size of board directors and audit committees are effective reducing earnings management behaviour and (3) firms in countries with higher agency cost level will take advantage corporate governance structure (size and independency of board directors and audit committees) to conduct earnings management. Furthermore, I also find that firms with bigger size (higher leverage) perform less (more) accounting discretion rather than its counterparts. This result is robust to different specifications of different models of generating abnormal accruals.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Investors generally are in favour towards legal mechanism for (1) protection of their property from expropriation, (2) high probability of claiming contracts, (3) calling for a meeting with management if there is a significant concern, and (4) cleanliness of public governance to avoid extra undesirable costs (Larcker & Tayan, 2011) . Additionally, in the condition of market and firm control system are poor, they still may benefit from government's intervention to overcome agency problem (Jensen, 2005) , and to even improve economic condition (Nguyen & van Dijk, 2012) . However, Larcker and Tayan (2011) argue that public governance with so-called interventions does not work properly (i.e. in protecting property rights) if corruption is perceived high. It is empirically evidenced that there is a significant inter-relationship and correlation between corruption and legal ineffectiveness (Herzfeld & Weiss, 2003 ) (Fisman & Miguel, 2007 ). Therefore, higher corruption level can be a measure to predict a country having ineffective legal system and lack investor protection implying higher agency cost.
Culture values in a country deliberately influences firms' activity. These values also define particular priorities and ambitions of firms (Schwartz, 1999) . Culture defines whether firms, as a structural part of society, are doing the correct operation in businesses or not. Countries across the world are culturally different. Hofstede (1980) developed national cultural dimensions.
Power distance portrays how unequal the distribution of power between leaders and workers within an institution. In countries with high score of power distance, the agency cost is perceived lower because social stratification is permissible and wellpracticed. Consequently, it is effortless to align incentives of management and shareholders. In contrast, low power distance countries require normative means e.g. outcome compensation to align agents and principal's incentives (Johnson & Droege, 2004) . Empirically, low power distance is significantly correlated with higher dividend pay-outs (Fidrmuc & Jacob, 2010) . Therefore, it can be hypothesized that lower power distance is a sign of high agency cost.
Another cultural dimension is tendency to avoid uncertainty which indicate how tolerance a society is for ambiguous situations, unknown future occasions, and unpredictable behaviour and thoughts (Hofstede, 1980) . It is argued that civilians with high uncertainty avoidance are more risk averse so they require higher rewards (e.g. higher discount rate or dividend pay-out ratio). Johnson and Droege (2004) propose that gain potential should overweigh the loss potential in the context of society with high avoidance of uncertainty. However, this idea is not always the case because a lower dividend pay-out ratio given by a firm is a sign of high predictability and stability. Research has been done supporting this idea that high uncertainty avoidance is correlated with high cash flow holding or low dividend pay-out ratio (Ramírez & Tadesse, 2009; Chang & Noorbakhsh, 2009; Fidrmuc & Jacob, 2010) . Thus, it is justifiable to consider high uncertainty avoidance as indicator of low agency cost.
Individualism is also an important dimension implying that an individual only concerns about himself and, if any, the closest colleagues (Hofstede, 1980) . Not surprising that agency theory empirical studies are found massively in western-countries (Johnson & Droege, 2004) because what drives this opportunistic-prospecting behaviour is claimed to be individualism as the main value of western culture. This is consistent with Fidrmuc & Jacob (2010) proposing idea that the agency cost of companies is higher in high individualism countries. In contrast, collectivist countries, mostly found in Eastern part of the world, are considered as countries with value that can align principal-agency interests. Thus, it can be assumed that high individualism contributes to high agency cost.
Lastly, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) developed new perspective of cultural dimension which is long-term orientation characterised by futureoriented, avoiding risk, maintaining current behaviour and perpetuating specific & innovative leadership. This is also a relevant culture dimension in this case. Chang and Noorbakhsh (2009) proved that firms operating in a higher long-term orientation country tend to retain more cash. Investors in longterm oriented culture are dependent on long-term profitability (e.g. maintaining the business performance is more preferable than taking high risk projects) or non-economic achievement (e.g. sustainability of worker) when they look for investment opportunity. Hence, this paper hypotheses high long-term orientation as a signal of low agency cost.
This study is to analyse the correlation between agency cost (based in cultural values and corruption level) and earnings management. Teoh, et al. (1998) find that earnings management is opportunistic. This detrimentally affect the principal as agents tend to choose reporting mechanism that may benefit their own interest (Healy & Palepu, 1993) . Discretion may result in low credibility of financial statements hence arising of difficulty for external source of fund (Ragan, 1998) . However, Arya, et al. (2003) contend that earnings management can be the similar form of interest between managers and agents. By doing earnings management, managers -by communication with expertise and high motivation of successful performance -may "improve" the firms' value and give the best prediction for future performance which is consistent with principal interest. Therefore, agency cost and earnings management are negatively correlated. Jiraporn, et al. (2008) and Subramanyam (1996) support this idea.
H1. Earnings quality is lower for firms in lower agency cost countries.
Corporate governance structures will be elaborated as the second phase of this study whether they are correlated with earnings discretion. Also, this study is to investigate the correlation of earnings management and interaction of corporate governance and high agency cost countries. There are four corporate governance variables studied in this study. Board of directors are liable in advisory and oversight (Larcker & Tayan, 2011) . Advisory role is the place of management to consult of strategic and operational directions while oversight role which covers monitoring power over management being at shareholders' interest. Such an important duty is hiring/firing CEO. Research showed that board size and meeting have correlation to firms' performance (Guest, 2009; Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg, Stefan, & Wells, 1998) . Empirically, studies in New Zealand (Ahmed, Hossain, & Adams, 2006) and US (Vafeas, 2005) found that board size has negative correlation with earnings quality. Different studies found that board size is insignificantly correlated with earnings timeliness (Bushman, Chen, Engel, & Smith, 2004) while other found positive correlation (Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999) . Therefore, this study is firstly to investigate the size of board of directors in its correlation with earnings quality.
Board independence is also relevant having incentives such as maintaining reputation.
Proven by research, independent boards work on-behalf of shareholders (Brickley, Coles, & Terry, 1994; Byrd & Hickman, 1992) . Empirically in Hong Kong (Jaggi, Leung, & Gul, 2009 ) and in US (Xie, Davidson III, & DaDalt, 2003; Klein, 2002) studies found that independence board is positively correlated with earnings estimation of accruals is different in such industry leaving this study with 148 firms to survey therefore there are 538 firmyear observations in this study. Financial data is collected from Worldscope database using US dollar currency rate as measurement for consistency while corruption perception index (CPI) is obtained from Transparency International and cultural values from Hofstede Centre.
Firstly, the agency scores are predicted as ranging from 0-100 based on country-specific measure: cultural values and CPI scores. Since the score of cultures and CPI are also ranging from 0-100, it is unnecessarily to rescale the measurement. Power distance, individualism, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation and CPI are assumed to have correlation with agency costs as discussed in literature review (see Figure 1) .
Figure 1 Assumed Correlation of Country-Specific Measures with Agency Cost
Then, countries are raked based on this total agency cost score. I define the first, second, and third rank countries as countries having high agency cost and lower rank countries (4 th , 5 th and 6 th ) as countries with low agency cost (see Figure 2 ). quality. Thus, board independence is the second variable of corporate governance of this study.
Lastly, audit committee is in charge of preventing audit fraud of firms overseeing the hiring, performance, and independence of external auditor chosen by management. Additionally, it is also supervising performance of internal audit function. Audit committee size and percentage of independent audit committee are factors that contribute to the high quality of audit committee. It is empirically evidenced that the percentage of independent audit committee is found to be negatively correlated with internal control problems (Krishnan, 2005) . It is because independent audit committees are at the interest of protecting reputation and credibility of company by finding error in internal audit function in the company. Similarly, previous literatures find a negative correlation between percentage of audit committee independence and abnormal accruals in US (Klein, 2002; Xie, Davidson III, & DaDalt, 2003; Vafeas, 2005 After that, using across countries regression, the earnings quality will be generated based on five accrual models below:
1. Jones (Jones, 1991) ACC it = β 0 + β 1 ∆REV it + β 2 PPE it + ε it 2. Dechow, et al. (Detecting Earnings Management, 1995) 
Kasznik (On the Association between
Voluntary Disclosure and Earnings Management, 1999) 
where: ACC = Total net income minus net cash flow operational divided by total asset current year ∆REV = Net turnover at time t minus turnover at time t-1 of a company divided by total asset current year ∆REC =Net receivables at time t minus receivables at time t-1 of a company divided by total current last year PPE = Net property, plant, and equipment of a company divided by total asset current year CFO= Net cash flow operational of a company divided by total asset current year ∆CFO = Net cash flow operational at time t minus net cash flow operational at time t-1 of a company divided by total asset current year K = Slope coefficient from regression ΔREC on ΔREV However, given that Model 4 and 5 include future year variables i.e. ∆REV it+1 and CFO it+1 hence this study applies (Lang & Lundholm, 1993) , book-to-market ratio (McNichols, 2000) and leverage ratio (Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 2005) as controls because those variables are associated with manager's behaviour.
|DACC| it = α 0 + α 1 HIGH it + ∑ γ Corporate Governance Factors it + ∑ θ HIGH * Corporate Governance
where: |DACC|= Absolute of discretionary accruals from accrual model divided by total asset current year HIGH = One if firm is operating in high agency cost country and zero otherwise SIZE = Natural logarithm of total asset divided by total asset current year BTM = Debt-to-equity ratio of a company at current year LEV = Book value divided by market value of a company at current year Corporate Governance Factor = Corporate governance factors generated from PCA analysis Table 1 presents the descriptive of corporate governance variables and its correlation matrix, and it shows that at least auditor independency and board independency are correlated. Note: BOD = number of board directors employed in a company; BOD_IND = percentage of independent board director employed in a company; AUD = number of audit committee employed in a company; AUD_IND = percentage of independent audit committee employed in a company 
RESULT AND ANALYSIS

Principal Component Analysis
Multivariate Analysis
This section is reporting the multivariate analysis designed to test the hypotheses of this study whether discretionary accruals are associated with (1) high agency cost country, (2) corporate governance factors and (3) interaction of high agency cost country and corporate governance factor. Note: ACC = total net income minus net cash flow operational divided by total asset current year; ∆REV = net turnover at time t minus turnover at time t-1 of a company divided by total asset current year; ∆REC = net receivables at time t minus receivables at time t-1 of a company divided by total current last year PPE = net property, plant, and equipment of a company divided by total asset current year; CFO = net cash flow operational of a company divided by total asset current year; ∆CFO = net cash flow operational at time t minus net cash flow operational at time t-1 of a company divided by total asset current year; K = slope coefficient from regression ΔREC on ΔREV.
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics of Variables for Five Accrual Models
Note: FEM_|DACC| = absolute discretionary accruals from FEM across countries, scaled by total asset; POOLED_|DACC| = absolute discretionary accruals from pooled panel across countries, scaled by total asset; HIGH = one if firm is operating in high agency cost country and zero otherwise; INDEPEN-DENCY = factor of corporate governance that describes the independency of board directors; BOARD SIZE = factor of corporate governance that describes the size of board directors employed; SIZE = natural logarithm of total asset divided by total asset current year; BTM = debt-to-equity ratio of a company at current year; LEV = book value divided by market value of a company at current year.
Model 1: ACCit = β0 + β1 ∆REVit + β2 PPEit + εit -Jones (Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations, 1991) Model 2: ACCit = β0 + β1 (∆REVit -∆RECit) + β2 PPEit + εit -Dechow, et al. (Detecting Earnings Management, 1995) Model 3: ACCit = β0 + β1 (∆REVit -∆RECit) + β2 PPEit + β3 ∆CFOit + εit -Kasznik (On the Association between Voluntary Disclosure and Earnings Management, 1999) Hasanuddin Economics and Business Review Vol. 1 No. 2 (142-160) After running accrual models, error terms for each model-regression is predicted and use them as proxy of abnormal accruals. Absolute abnormal accruals are plotted as proxy of earnings management because both incomeincreasing and income-decreasing are forms of accounting manipulation. Absolute abnormal accruals are obtained from Model 1-3 in main analysis and from Model 4 and 5 in sensitivity analysis. Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of variables for further regressions. Total sample is 538 firm-year observations consisting firm-year observations in low agency countries (HIGH = 0; n = 293) and those operating in high agency countries (HIGH = 1; n = 245), see Panel C. Panel A describes the different measurements of abnormal accruals generated as dependent variables. Panel B reports the descriptive of corporate governance factors and its interactions to be included in the model to answer hypothesis H2 and H3. I run linear regression of high dummy, corporate governance factors, interaction of high dummy and corporate governance factors, and control variables on different types of absolute abnormal accruals measurements. Author include year dummy and cluster standard error for firm for each regression. Table 5 presents the pairwise correlation of variables. It appears that BOARD SIZE and HIGH have negative correlation with abnormal accruals. Also, it appears that SIZE and BTM (LEV) are negatively (positively) correlated with abnormal accruals. These can be evidences to support hypothesis H1 and H2; however, these correlations should be interpreted with caution because firm's characteristics should be controlled in cross-sectional analysis. Moreover, the table shows that VIFs are all below 10 indicating that the model does not have multicollinearity problem. Note: All variables are defined in Table 4 . * significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Table  6 specifically reports regression analysis using two different measurement of absolute abnormal accruals from Model 1 of Jones (1991) using FEM and pooled panel data regressions. It shows that HIGH, INDEPENDENCY, and BOARD SIZE are negatively correlated with abnormal accruals. HIGH * INDEPENDENCY and HIGH * BOARD SIZE are positively correlated with abnormal accruals. Also, it depicts that SIZE has negative correlation with abnormal accruals. This supports hypothesis H1 that firms in low agency cost countries have higher abnormal accruals. This also shows that independency and size of board directors and audit committee are effectively reducing earnings management effort. However, evidences depict that firms in high agency cost countries take advantages of corporate governance structure to conduct earnings management. Furthermore, results identify that bigger firms tend to do earnings management rather than its counterparts. Table 7 reports result of regression analysis using two different measurement of absolute abnormal accruals from Model 2 of Dechow, et al. (1995) using FEM and pooled panel data regressions. It describes that HIGH, INDEPENDENCY, and BOARD SIZE are negatively correlated with abnormal accruals. HIGH * INDEPENDENCY and HIGH * BOARD SIZE are positively correlated with abnormal accruals. Also, it depicts that SIZE has negative correlation with abnormal accruals. These results are similar with Table 6 beforehand generates. Note: FEM_|DACC| = absolute discretionary accruals from FEM across countries, scaled by total asset; POOLED_|DACC| = absolute discretionary accruals from pooled panel across countries, scaled by total asset; HIGH = one if firm is operating in high agency cost country and zero otherwise; INDEPENDENCY = factor of corporate governance that describes the independency of board directors; BOARD SIZE = factor of corporate governance that describes the size of board directors employed; SIZE = natural logarithm of total asset divided by total asset current year; BTM = debt-to-equity ratio of a company at current year; LEV = book value divided by market value of a company at current year. Note: FEM_|DACC| = absolute discretionary accruals from FEM across countries, scaled by total asset; POOLED_|DACC| = absolute discretionary accruals from pooled panel across countries, scaled by total asset; HIGH = one if firm is operating in high agency cost country and zero otherwise; INDEPENDENCY = factor of corporate governance that describes the independency of board directors; BOARD SIZE = factor of corporate governance that describes the size of board directors employed; SIZE = natural logarithm of total asset divided by total asset current year; BTM = debt-to-equity ratio of a company at current year; LEV = book value divided by market value of a company at current year.
Model 2: et al. (Detecting Earnings Management, 1995) *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant 10% level Table 8 reports regression analysis using two different measurement of abnormal accruals from Model 3 of Kasznik (1999) using FEM and pooled panel data regressions. It describes that HIGH, INDEPENDENCY, and BOARD SIZE are negatively correlated with abnormal accruals. HIGH * INDEPENDENCY is positively correlated with abnormal accruals. Also, it depicts that LEV has positive correlation with abnormal accruals. These findings are similar with what previous results generate. However, evidences depict that firms in high agency cost countries take advantages of corporate governance only with independent board structure to conduct earnings management. Furthermore, results identify that firms with higher leverage conduct more earnings management behaviour than its counterparts. Overall, it can be concluded that (1) firms in high agency cost level have higher earnings quality rather than its counterparts, (2) independency and size of board directors and audit committees are negatively correlated with abnormal accruals (3) the correlation of independency or size (of board directors and audit committees) and abnormal accruals is stronger for firms operating in high agency cost countries. This shows that (1) earnings management is efficient (2) indeed independency and size of board directors and audit committees are effective reducing earnings management behaviour and Note: FEM_|DACC| = absolute discretionary accruals from FEM across countries, scaled by total asset; POOLED_|-DACC| = absolute discretionary accruals from pooled panel across countries, scaled by total asset; HIGH = one if firm is operating in high agency cost country and zero otherwise; INDEPENDENCY = factor of corporate governance that describes the independency of board directors; BOARD SIZE = factor of corporate governance that describes the size of board directors employed; SIZE = natural logarithm of total asset divided by total asset current year; BTM = debt-to-equity ratio of a company at current year; LEV = book value divided by market value of a company at current year.
Model 3: ACC it = β 0 + β 1 (∆REV it -∆REC it ) + β 2 PPE it + β 3 ∆CFO it + ε it -Kasznik (On the Association between Voluntary Disclosure and Earnings Management, 1999) *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant 10% level (3) firms in countries with higher agency cost level will take advantage corporate governance structure (size and independency of board directors and audit committees) to conduct earnings management. Furthermore, this study also infers that firms with bigger size (bigger leverage) perform less (more) accounting discretion rather than its counterparts.
Sensitivity Analysis
This sub-section presents sensitivity analysis of previous regression analysis. Absolute abnormal accruals are employed as measurements using two alternative accrual models (Dechow, Richardson, & Tuna, 2002; Dechow & Dichev, 2002) . Because these models include future variables, 135 firmyear observations (25.09%) of total sample before are dropped out from the analysis. Therefore, in this sensitivity analysis, there are 54.09% of firm-year observations operating in low agency cost countries (HIGH = 0; n = 218) and 45.91% of those operating in high agency cost countries (HIGH = 1; n = 185). Author runs regression including year dummies and I cluster standard error for firms in all regressions. Note: FEM_|DACC| = absolute discretionary accruals from FEM across countries, scaled by total asset; POOLED_|DACC| = absolute discretionary accruals from pooled panel across countries, scaled by total asset; HIGH = one if firm is operating in high agency cost country and zero otherwise; INDEPENDENCY = factor of corporate governance that describes the independency of board directors; BOARD SIZE = factor of corporate governance that describes the size of board directors employed; SIZE = natural logarithm of total asset divided by total asset current year; BTM = debt-to-equity ratio of a company at current year; LEV = book value divided by market value of a company at current year. Model 4: ACC it = β 0 + β 1 (∆REV it -(1 -k) ∆REC it ) + β 2 PPE it + β 3 ACC it-1 + β 4 ∆REV it+1 + ε it Model 5: ACC it = β 0 + β 1 CFO it-1 + β 2 CFO it + β 3 CFO it+1 + β 4 (∆REV it -∆REC it ) + β 5 PPE it + ε it *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant 10% level Table 9 shows the regression result of sensitivity analysis. Overall, evidences are consistent with main analysis. Results show that (1) firms in high agency cost level country have higher earnings quality rather than its counterparts, (2) independency and size of board directors and audit committees are negatively correlated with abnormal accruals and (3) the correlation between board independency (or board size) and abnormal accruals is stronger for firms operating in high agency cost countries. This confirms previous finding in main analysis that (1) earnings management is efficient (2) independency and board size factors are effective reducing earnings management behaviour and (3) firms in countries with higher agency cost level will take advantage of corporate governance structures (in case of independency and size of board directors and audit committees) to conduct earnings management. Furthermore, Sensitivity analysis result shows that size and book-to-market ratio (leverage) are negatively (positively) correlated with abnormal accruals. This means that bigger firms and underpriced firms perform less for accounting discretion rather than its counterparts while firms with higher leverage conduct more earnings management than its counterparts.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study scrutinises the association between abnormal accruals and (1) high agency cost country, (2) corporate governance factors and (3) interaction of high agency cost country and corporate governance factor.
Evidences describe that (1) firms in high agency cost level have higher earnings quality rather than its counterparts, (2) firms with higher independency and size of board directors and audit committees are negatively correlated with abnormal accruals (3) the correlation of independency or size (of board directors and audit committees) and abnormal accruals is stronger for firms operating in high agency cost countries. This shows that (1) earnings management is efficient (2) indeed independency and size of board directors and audit committees are effective reducing earnings management behaviour and (3) firms in countries with higher agency cost level will take advantage corporate governance structure (size and independency of board directors and audit committees) to conduct earnings management. Furthermore, I also find that firms with bigger size (higher leverage) perform less (more) accounting discretion rather than its counterparts.
This finding contributes the existing literatures that typical earnings management in six SEA countries is efficient, e.g. in Indonesia (Siregar & Utama, 2008) . This finding also contributes the general idea of existing literatures that audit committee and board director's independencies are governance means that effectively reduce earnings management (Klein, 2002) . Also, evidence shows that size of board directors and audit committees is also effective to decrease earnings management which is not consistent with common view, but somehow similar with Larcker, et al. (2007) . Lastly, there are enough evidences showing that corporate governance structure advantages can be an opportunistic driver for firms in countries with high agency cost to conduct earnings management.
Implication and Suggestion for Further Research
Based on results of this study, there are several implications identified. First, standard setters should be more aware in governing and adjusting regulations based on cultural values and corruption level differences because they can affect the agency cost level as well as the earnings management behaviour. Second, investors may look forward to look at the earnings account for their investment decision. There are also several limitations of this research that can be developed. First, financial and governance data is not generally available or complete, especially in country such as Vietnam. Second, the sample employed for further research should be extended into bigger sample (firm and year) or even the whole population. Third, model fit is still too low, so the model can be developed through adding governance variables, modifying and identifying other the variables, and looking for more suitable factors for future research.
